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Abstract
The typical  post-Bretton Woods era development  growth, and public sector size.  But decentralization  is
approach that emphasized central  government-led  surprisingly  difficult to measure.  Nearly all  cases
development  efforts has changed dramatically,  and local  examining  the relationship  between  decentralization  and
governments  have clearly  emerged  as players in  macroeconomic  performance  have relied  on the
development  policy. The thinking about what is  Government  Finance  Statistics  (GFS)  of the International
important  to achieve  in development  objectives  is  Monetary  Fund.  However, despite its merits,  GFS falls
changing  as fiscal decentralization  reforms are being  short in providing a full  picture of fiscal decentralization.
pursued by many countries around the world. In this  For some  countries, however,  there is data that more
context, a number of studies  have attempted  to quantify  accurately  captures fiscal responsibilities  among different
the impact of decentralization  by relating  some measure  types of governments.
of it to economic  outcomes of fiscal  stability,  economic
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INTRODUCTION:  SCOPE AND PURPOSE
For  much  of  the  post-Bretton  Woods  era,  the  typical  development
approach  emphasized  central  government  plans  and  programs.  The
thinking was that  if a  poor country  could  come up with a national  plan
for generating  and  investing  a  sufficient  amount  of funds  in  a manner
consistent  with  macro-stability,  then  that  country  would  have  met  the
pre-conditions  for  development.  It  would  be  a  state-led  (central
government)  strategy  whereby  the  "flexibility  to  implement  polices
devised by technocrats  was accorded a pride of place, and accountability
through checks  and balances  was  regarded  as  an  encumbrance."2 Until
perhaps the  mid  1990s,  this  was the  main message of not only  the two
Bretton  Woods  institutions-International  Monetary  Fund  and  World
Bank-but also of other multilaterals and many bilaterals.
It was not an unreasonable strategy.  Bretton Woods reflected  a world
emerging from the ravages  of war, when  much of the  developing  world
was  gaining  its  political  independence.  Development  seemed  a
surmountable  and  largely  technical  challenge:  good  advisors  would
devise  good policies, and technically  assisted  and institutionally capable
governments  would  implement  those  policies.3 There  could  even  be
stages,  from the first  "mission"  to an "exit strategy"-words  that reveal
so well the thinking of the time.
There  was  some  progress,  especially  in  infant  mortality  rates,  life
expectancy,  and  adult  literacy.  There  were  also  many  failures.4 The
failures  were not just about an inability  to demonstrate sustained  growth
rates.  They  were  also  about  environmental  deterioration,  loss of  civil
liberties,  corruption,  and a very poor record of delivering  "local"  public
services-clean  water, sanitation,  education,  health, housing,  safety  nets,
and,  as  some  argue,  poverty  alleviation.5 These  were  failures  in an  era
when the scope of central government expanding  enormously.6
Now,  the thinking  about  what  is important  to  achieve  development
objectives  is  changing,  dramatically  so  in  some  countries.  Writing  in
1994,  Dillinger  reported  (in  what  has  become  one  of the  most quoted
World Bank reports) that of the 75 developing countries with populations
greater  than 5 million,  all  but 12 claimed  to be embarked on some  form
of  transfer  of fiscal  authority  from  central  to  local  governments.  This
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countries,  such as the Kingdoms of Jordan  and Morocco  (Ebel,  Fox and
Melhem,  1995;  Vaillancourt,  1997;  World  Bank,  1999),  Central  and
Eastern  Europe  states  that  were  under  the  Soviet-type  fiscal  system
(Dunn  and  Wetzel,  2000;  Bird,  Ebel  and  Wallich,  1995),  the  People's
Republic  of China (Wong,  1997),  military  regimes  like Pakistan  (Shah,
1996;  Pakistan  NRB,  2001),  countries  like  Thailand  that  view
decentralization  as  an  efficiency  strategy  for  improving  local  service
delivery in reaction  to financial  crises (World Bank, 2000); nation-states
that are  trying to  avoid the centrifugal forces of separatism,  like Russia
(Wallich,  1994;  and Martinez-Vazquez  and Boex,  2001)  and  Indonesia
(Ahmad and Hofman,  2001; Bird et al., 2001), and Latin America,  where
participatory  budgeting  is  taking  hold  (Stein,  1997;  Burki,  Perry  and
Dillinger, 1999).
The  World  Bank is  very  explicit on  the  importance  of all  this:  the
World Development Report on Entering  the 215' Century notes that along
with  globalization  (continuing  integration  of  countries  worldwide),
localization-the  desire  for  self-determination  and  the  devolution  of
power-is the main force "shaping the world in which  development  will
be  defined  and  implemented"  in  the  first  decade  of this  century.  The
report  argues  that  these  "defining  forces  of  globalization  and
localization,"  which  at first glance  may  seem countervailing,  often stem
from the same factors  and reinforce one another (WDR,  199912000).
The theme  that  emerges  is  that  "good  governance"  matters,  where
"governance"  is  about how people determine  collectively which  services
should be  delivered  by  which  government,  and  do so by establishing  a
set of transparent  and competent  public  institutions  they  can understand
and control. It is a theme that is tied to "getting right" what Bird refers to
as  the  fundamental  questions  of intergovernmental  finance:  Who  does
what? Who levies which taxes (and is there a place for borrowing)? How
can  the  resulting  imbalances  be  resolved?  What  is  the  institutional
framework  to  deal  with  the  technical  and  political  problems  of
decentralization?7
Within  this  context  a number  of  studies  attempted  to  quantify  the
impacts of decentralization by relating some  measure of decentralization
to  the  economic  outcomes  of  fiscal  stability,  economic  growth,  and
public  sector  size  (Davoodi  and  Zou,  1998;  deMello,  2000;  Ehdaie,
1994;  Fukasaku  and  deMello,  1998,  Oates,1985).8  Nearly  all of these
studies  draw  on  Government  Finance  Statistics  (GFS)  issued  by  theOn the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization 4
International  Monetary  Fund  as  the  basis  for  measuring
"decentralization."
As  emphasized  by  Bird  (2000),  however,  measurement  is
surprisingly  difficult.  And, if one  cannot be confident of measuring  the
independent  variable,  then one  cannot  state  with  much  confidence  that
decentralization  is associated with one or more outcomes.
The  purpose  of this paper is to  take a critical look at the nature and
implications  of  measuring  the  fiscal  dimension  of  decentralization.
Recognizing  that "a curious  combination  of strong preconceived  beliefs
and  limited  empirical  evidence"  characterizes  all  too  much  of  the
discussion  (Litvack  et  al.,  1998;  Bird,  2000),  we  look  at  two  policy
issues:  (1)  the extent to which fiscal decentralization  is occurring  and (2)
the  fragility of estimation  results depending  on how  one measures fiscal
decentralization  (and,  therefore,  the  danger  in  drawing  sweeping
conclusions that often have important  policy implications).
We  start  with  GFS,  but  supplement  this  measure  with  other
considerations  that  recognize  more  fully  subnational  autonomy  and
discretion in expenditure  and taxation arrangements.  We  find substantial
differences  between  GFS  indicators  and  those  that  capture  more
accurately  fiscal  responsibilities  among  different  types  of  government.
We estimate  the impact  of these various  measures  of decentralization  on
economic  stability,  economic  growth,  and  public  sector  size.  Not
surprisingly,  we find that the different  indicators have markedly different
effects on economic performance.
THE  FRAMEWORK FOR MEASUREMENT
The  conceptual  framework  of  fiscal  decentralization  is  well
established,  drawing  largely on  the  contributions  by Stigler,  Musgrave,
Oates,  and  Buchanan.  Here  is  the  core  logic: to  care  about growth  and
poverty  issues,  one  should  be  concerned  about  efficiency-supplying
services  up  to the  point at  which,  at the margin,  the  welfare  benefit  to
society  matches its cost. In  the private  sector, the market-price  system  is
the mechanism.  When  the market  fails  in this  objective,  there  is a case
for the public  commandeering  of resources  to supply the  activity.  OnceOn the Measurenent  and Impact of Fiscal Decentralization 5
the public sector intervenes,  the efficiency logic  is in favor of some form
of  fiscal  decentralization.  The  argument  is  that  spatial  considerations
make  subnational  governments  necessary  conduits  for  setting  up  a
system  of  budgets  that  best  approximates  the  efficient  solution  of
equating  benefits  and  costs.  This leads  to the decentralization  theorem:
The  governments  closest  to  the  citizens  can  adjust  budgets  (costs)  to
local preferences  in a manner that best leads  to the delivery  of a bundle
of  public  services  that  is  responsive  to  community  preferences.
Subnational  governments  thus  become agencies  that provide  services  to
identifiable  recipients up to  the point  at  which  the  value placed  on  the
last (marginal) amount of services for which recipients are willing to pay
is just equal  to the benefit  they receive.9 To implement this, subnational
(local)  governments  must  be  given  the  authority  to  exercise  "own-
source"  taxation  at  the margin  and  be  in  a  financial  position  to  do so.
This is the essence of decentralization.
How,  in  practice,  does  one  say  that  a  country  is  decentralizing?
While there is no set of prescribed  rules, we draw on Bahl and others to
identify  11  characteristics,  which  range from  the requirement  for open
local  elections  to  the  fundamental  "essence"  question  of  whether
subnational  governments  have  (at  least)  tax  rate-setting  authority  over
locally  assigned  revenues  (Bahl,  1999).  A  checklist  for  six  transition
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia,  Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland)
serves  to  explain  our  selection  of countries  that  we  can  point  to  as
politically  "decentralized"  for the purposes  of making  some  statements
about  whether  decentralization  matters  in  terms  of  its  promised
benefits.'(  We also have access to new data that goes directly to the point
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EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION
The  literature  on  the  relationship  between  decentralization  and
different  macro  indicators  is growing.  Most  of these  studies  are cross-
country  analyses  using the Government  Finance Statistics  (GFS)  of the
International  Monetary  Fund,  and  all  describe  the  degree  of  fiscal
decentralization  as  the  subnational  share  of  total  government
spending/revenue or of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).'
Comparing  the degree of fiscal decentralization  across countries is  a
complex  task that  requires  identification  of subnational  autonomy  and
discretion  on  expenditure  and  revenue  arrangements.  Although  it  is
widely  accepted  that  subnational  share  of  total  government
spending/revenue  is an imperfect  measure  of fiscal decentralization  and
that  the  need  to  standardize  the  fiscal  variables  in  GFS  inevitably
eliminates  details  about  the  design  of fiscal  systems,  many  researchers
use these measures to represent the degree of fiscal decentralization.
What are We Trying to Analyze?
Recognizing  that  GFS  has  served  well  as  a  product  of the  central
government forces of the post-Bretton  Woods development  model, three
major  problems  emerge  when  using  the  data in  an  empirical  study  on
fiscal decentralization:
First,  although  GFS  provides  a  breakdown  of expenditures  by
function and economic  type,  it does  not identify  the degree  of local
expenditure  autonomy.  Thus,  local  expenditures  that  are  mandated
by  the  central  government  or  are  spent  on  behalf  of  central
government  appear as subnational expenditure.'2
Second,  GFS does not distinguish  the sources of tax and non-tax
revenues,  intergovernmental  transfers, and other grants.  Hence, there
is no  information  on whether  revenues  are collected  through  shared
taxes,  piggybacked  taxes,  or  locally  determined  "own-source"
revenues.
Third,  GFS  does  not  disclose  what  proportion  of
intergovernmental  transfers  is  conditional  as  opposed  to  general-
purpose,  and  whether  transfers  are  distributed  according  to  an
objective  criteria  or a discretionary  measure.  We will argue  that thisOn theMeasurementand Impactof Fiscal  Decentralization 7
distinction between conditional/objective  formula grants versus more
centrally tied "discretionary"/specific  purpose grants can be  a useful
variable  as  a  country  makes  the transition  from deconcentration  to
devolution.
These  aggregation problems  limit the use of subnational statistics  in
the  GFS  data set. Thus,  although  GFS has consistent  definitions across
countries and over time, the subnational expenditure  and revenue figures
have little  relevance  in the decentralization  context  because  the data fail
to  address  properly  the  intergovernmental  fiscal  structure  of countries
and  ignore the degree  of central  government control  over local tax rates
and tax bases. Thus,  with GFS, the subnational revenue and expenditure
share  in  total  government  revenue/spending  ends  up  being  an
overestimate of fiscal decentralization.
This  overestimation  of the fiscal  decentralization  indicator  can  be
illustrated  by  analyzing  the  revenue  structure  of  subnational
governments.  Until  recently,  such  a comparison  was  impossible  due  to
lack  of data  that  were  both  disaggregated  and  fit  what  we  identified
above  as  the  essence  of public  sector  decentralization-the  ability  of
local  govemments to set the tax rate at the margin. Such data is available
now  for  a  set  of  EU-accession  countries  from  the  Organisation  for
Economic  Cooperation and  Development's  survey  Fiscal Design Across
Levels of Government (OECD, 2001).'3
OECD  identifies  three  sources  of  subnational  revenues-tax
revenues,  non-tax  revenues,  and  intergovernmental  grants-for  the
Czech Republic, Estonia,  Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (Table
1).  Tax  revenues  and  intergovernmental  grants  are further  divided  into
two groups.  If subnational governments  have total or significant control
over a tax as defined by an "own" control over tax rate or a revenue tax
base  and  rate,  this  is  listed  as  "own  tax  revenue."  If  subnational
governments  have limited  or no control over the rate  and base of a tax
and the central government  determines  how to split revenues,  it is listed
as "revenues from tax sharing."'4 Non-tax  revenues include income from
business  operations  and  property,  administrative  fees  and  duties,  and
fines.On the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  8
Table 1: Comparison of GFS Data with Fiscal Design  Survey of OECD (1999)
Country  GFS'  Expenditure  Revenue  Composition of Subnational Revenues
Share2 Share2
Tax Revenue  Non-tax  Grant  Total
Revenue 5
Own-  Tax-  General-  Specifi
Taxes3 Sharing 4 Purpose
6 c
7
Czech  21.0  18.3  20.8  3.9  43.8  36.3  0  16.0  100
Republic
Hungary  23.0  23.7  26.7  16.3  16.8  17.0  1.7  48.2  100
Poland  31.0  27.6  28.8  10.6  14.4  24.6  30.5  19.9  100
Estonia  21.0  19.7  22.1  6.3  62.1  9.1  13.4  9.1  100
Latvia  24.0  23.1  25.0  0  66.2  14.1  5.8  13.9  100
Lithuania  20.0  19.6  22.8  0  91.0  4.8  2.3  1.9  100
ISubnational expenditures  in total government expenditure.
2 As reported  in OECD, 2001.
3Subnational  government sets tax rate and/or tax base.
4 Central  government sets tax rate and base and determines revenue-split.
5Revenues,  such as fees and user charges, that are assessed  by subnational  governments.
6 General-purpose  grants are those that can be treated like own-source revenue. General-purpose  grants can be distributed  according to objective criteria (such
as tax capacity,  expenditure  needs) as well as at the discretion of the central government.
7 Specific grants are tied sources of revenue.  Specific grants  are given to cover certain amount of costs of a service mandated by the central  government or a
function that is delivered  on its behalf.On the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization 9
Intergovernmental  grants  are  further  classified  as  either  general
purpose  or  specific.  For  expenditure  purposes,  general-purpose  grants
can be used like own revenues,  but they may be allocated based on either
objective criteria  or the central  government's discretion.  Specific  grants
are earmarked for certain purposes, and the allocation may or may not be
conditional  across  subnational  governments.  Therefore,  general-purpose
and specific grants are identified  as separate subgroups. 15
The  first  three columns  of Table  1 report  the aggregate  figures  of
subnational  expenditures  and  revenues  for the  six  transition  countries.
The  GFS  column  presents  subnational  governments'  share  in  total
government expenditure  as  used in most empirical  studies.  Comparison
of the GFS data with the aggregates  reported in the OECD study  shows
very little  discrepancy  between  them.  The detailed  subnational revenues
reported in the OECD study, however, tell a very different  story.
The composition of revenues reveals that subnational  governments in
these six countries have very little control over their revenues. Therefore,
aggregate  revenue  figures  overrepresent  the  degree  of  fiscal
decentralization.  For  example,  in  Lithuania,  91  percent  of subnational
governments'  revenues  come  from  shared  taxes  for  which  the  central
government  sets  the  rates  and  bases  and  controls  revenue  split.
Subnational  governments in Lithuania have control over only  4.8 percent
of their revenues.  Thus, almost all local revenues are under the control of
the  central  government,  and the  aggregate  revenue  (expenditure)  figure
grossly  overrepresents  the  degree  of  fiscal  decentralization.  But  the
aggregate  data tell a very different,  and misleading,  story  (columns 2,  3
and 4).
Table 2 provides further detail on subnational own revenues in all six
transition  countries. In general,  their subnational  governments  have very
little  revenue  autonomy,  especially in Baltic countries.  The first column
presents  own  revenues  over which subnational  governments have policy
control.  This  control  is  essential  for  effective  decentralization.
Subnational governments  in Czech Republic  have the highest percentage
share of own-source revenues (almost all are non-tax revenues),  which is
only 40 percent of total revenues.On the Measurement  and impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  10
Table 2: Share of Subnational Own-Revenues  in Total Revenues
Own-Taxes  +  General Purpose Grants  Specific  Grant  Total
Non-Tax  (with objective  criteria)  (not conditional)
Revenue
Czech Rep.  40.2  0  6.5  46.7
Hungary  33.3  0.3  0.8  34.4
Poland  35.2  30.5  0  65.7
Estonia  15.4  13.4  0  28.8
Latvia  14.1  5.8  0  19.9
Lithuania  4.8  2.3  0  7.1
Source: OECD, Taxing Powers of State and Local Government  (Paris, 2001,  1999).
The  next  two columns  report  intergovernmental  grants.  One might
argue  that  general-purpose  grants  and  specific  grants  cannot  be  own
sources  of  revenue,  and  we  recognize  the  merits  of  this  view.
Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above and for a limited purpose here,
we risk the overestimation  bias and  include  general-purpose  grants  with
objective  criteria  and  non-conditional  specific  grants  in  the
decentralization  variable.  The argument  is that  subnational  governments
have at least expenditure  autonomy over these grants. Discretionary  and
conditional  grants  that  cover  all  or  parts  of services  mandated  by  the
central  government  are  excluded.  But,  even  with  this  liberal
interpretation  of  the  disaggregated  subnational  revenue  data,  the  case
remains  strong  against  using  aggregate  revenue/expenditure  figures  to
measure decentralization.
Cross-country  studies  that  do  not  capture  the  variation  in
intergovernmental  fiscal  design  misrepresent  the  degree  of  fiscal
decentralization  in some transition countries,  as seen, for example,  in the
aggregation  of revenue/expenditure  figures  in Table  1. In  other,  mostly
developed  countries where  subnational governments  have discretion over
revenues  and  expenditures,  aggregated  figures  might  be  appropriate  inOn the Measurement wad lnpacr  of Fiscal  Decentralization  11
representing  the  degree  of  fiscal  decentralization  (see  Table  3,  next
page).'6 Table  3  shows  the  significant  variation  in  degree  of  tax
autonomy  for  subnational  governments  in  developed  and  developing
countries.  Subnational  governments  in  developing  countries  get  a
significant  portion  of  their  tax  revenues  from  tax  sharing,  whereas
subnational  governments  in developed countries either have control over
tax  rate  and  base  or must approve  any  changes  in the  revenue  split of
shared taxes.
The Question  of Macro Indicators
At first, the revenue structure of a country may seem just a detail that
has  no  bearing  on  the  empirical  analysis.  The  revenue  structure  of
subnational  governments,  however,  has  important  implications  for  the
outcome  of the  fiscal  decentralization  process  (Bird,  2001,  p.  9.)  The
coordination  failures  arising  from  an  improperly  designed  revenue
system  may  induce  subnational  governments  to  spend  inefficiently  and
endanger  macroeconomic  stability  by  aggravating  fiscal  imbalance.  A
key to the success  of  decentralization  is to design  a system of multilevel
public finances to provide local services effectively  and efficiently  while
maintaining  macroeconomic  stability  (deMello,  2000). Accountability  at
the margin  is an important characteristic  of a revenue system that fosters
prudence  in  debt  and  expenditure  management.  It  is  impossible  for  a
subnational  government  not  to  have  control  over  revenue  margins  and
still be fully accountable.
These points have been  overlooked in most of the empirical studies.
Studies  using  variables  that misrepresent  the degree  of decentralization
find  an  implausible  impact  of fiscal  decentralization  on macroeconomic
stability, economic growth, and public  sector size. For example, in recent
cross-country  studies using GFS data, deMello (2000), Davoodi  and Zou
(1998),  and Oates  (1985)  analyze  the  impact  fiscal  decentralization  on
budget balance,  economic  growth, and public sector  size, respectively.
DeMello  (2000)  looks  at  the  impact  of fiscal  decentralization  on
budget  balance,  measured  as  the ratio  of the fiscal  deficit to  GDP,  and
argues that  decentralization  promotes fiscal  imbalance.  He uses  several
independent  variables  that explain budget balance,  including subnational
tax  autonomy  (ratio  of  tax  revenue  to  total  subnational  revenue),
subnational  fiscal  dependency  (ratio  of intergovernmental  transfers  to
total  subnational  revenue),  and  subnational  spending  share  (ratio  ofOn the Measurenent and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  12
subnational  government  spending  to  total  government  spending).
Similarly,  Davoodi  and  Zou  (1998)  look  at  the  relationship  between
economic  growth  and  fiscal  decentralization,  measured  as  the
subnational  share  of total  government  spending,  and  argue  that  fiscal
decentralization  is  associated  with  slower  economic  growth.  On  the
relationship  between  fiscal  decentralization  and  total  public  sector size,
Oates  (1985)  reports  no  supporting  evidence  for  the  "Leviathan"
hypothesis. '
In order to explore  how the fiscal decentralization  variable  selection
affects  the estimation  results-and  how  important  the  selection  is-we
replicated  the  deMello,  Davoodi  and  Zou,  and  Oates  models  using
OECD  data  and  ran  the  analyses  for the  six  transition  countries  listed
above.'8  As  presented  below,  the  estimation  results  with  a  fiscal
decentralization  variable  that represents  subnational  revenue structure of
subnational  governments  are  very  different  from those  reported  for the
other three models.'9On the Measurenent  and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  13
Table 3: Subnational Government Taxes As Percentage of Total Tax Revenue "Tax Autonomy"
Own Tax Revenue  Tax Revenue Sharing
SNG Sets  SNG  SNG Sets  Revenue Split  Revenue Split  Revenue  Central
Tax Rate  Sets  Tax Base  May be  Fixed in  Split  Government
and Base  Tax  Only  Changed with  Legislation  Determined  Sets Rate and
Rate  Consent of  (May be Changed  by the  Base of SNG
Only  SNG  Unilaterally  by  Central  Tax
the Central  Governmen
Government)  t
Czech  Rep.  2.0  5.0  3.0  0  90.0  0  0
(95)
Hungary (95)  0  30  0  0  0  0  70
Poland (95)  0  45.0  1.0  0  54.0  0  0
Estonia (97)  0  9.8  0  0  90.2  0  0
Latvia (97)  0  0  0  0  0  0  100
Lithuania (97)  0  0  0  0  0  0  100
Austria (95)  5.9  6.0  0  88.1  0  0  0
Belgium  (95)  5.1  49.1  0  45.3  0.4  0.2  0
Denmark (95)  0  95.2  0  0  2.7  0  2.1
Finland (95)  0.01  88.6  0  0  11.4  0  0
Germany (95)  0.3  13.2  0  86.5  0  0  0
Iceland (95)  8.0  92.0  0  0  0  0  0
Japan (95)  0.1  89.8  0  0  0  0  10.1
Mexico (95)  0  0  0  74.6  18.8  0  6.6
Netherlands  0  100  0  0  0  0  0
(95)
N.  Zealand  98.0  0  0  0  0  0  2.0
(95)
Norway  (95)  0  3.7  0  0  0.6  95.7  0
Portugal (95)  30.1  8.6  0  0  0  0  61.3
Spain (95)  26.7  35.4  0  37.9  0  0  0
Sweden (95)  0.3  99.7  0  0  0  0  0
Switzerland  51.8  40.8  0  3.2  4.2  0  0
(95)
U. K. (95)  0  100  0  0  0  0  0
Sources: OECD, Taxing Powers of State and Local Government (Paris, 2001,  1999).On the Mkeasurement and lmpact  e?f Fiscal  Decentrali-ation 14
Economic  Stability
In the deMello  (2001)  study, budget  balance measured as the ratio of
the  fiscal  deficit  to GDP  is  the  dependent  variable  and subnational  tax
autonomy  is  an  independent  variable.  In his  estimations,  the  coefficient
of the  subnational  tax  autonomy  variable  is  positive  and  statistically
significant;  thus,  subnational  tax autonomy  "worsen[s]  fiscal positions."
As  we  have  argued,  however,  a  close  look  at  deMello's  independent
variables  shows  that  they  do  not  represent  what  he  intends  to test.  For
example,  his  approach  to  estimating  the  subnational  tax  autonomy
variable  does not distinguish whether the  governments  have control  over
the  tax  rate  or  tax  base.  As  discussed  previously,  subnational
governments  in  most developing  countries  do  not  control  the  tax  rates;
therefore,  what he means  by tax autonomy  is unclear.  If tax autonomy  is
defined as the ratio of own taxes  (the sum of first three columns in Table
3)  to  total  subnational  revenues,  the  same  variable  is  negative  and
statistically  significant.  Therefore,  by  following  deMello's  lead,  one
could argue that subnational  tax autonomy improves  the fiscal position of
subnational governments.
In  deMello's  study,  the impact  of fiscal  dependency  on  subnational
fiscal  positions  is  statistically  insignificant.  He  uses  the  ratio  of total
transfers  to total subnational  revenues  as the  fiscal  dependency  variable
regardless  of whether the distribution  is based on an objective  formula  or
the  central  government's  discretion.  We  have  estimated  the  fiscal
dependency  variable  in two  ways.  The  first the  same  as  deMello:  the
ratio  of  intergovernmental  transfers  to  total  revenue  of  subnational
governments.  In order to reduce overestimation  bias, our second  method
excludes  transfers that can be treated  like own-source revenue  (see Table
2),  and  the  fiscal  dependency  variable  is  the  ratio  of  the  sum  of the
conditional  part  of specific  grants  and the discretionary  (not objectively
determined)  part of general-purpose  grants to total subnational revenues.
In  our  replication,  both  of  the  fiscal  dependency  variables  are
positive  and  significant.  Therefore,  again  following  deMello's  lead,  we
can  argue  that  intergovernmental  transfers  "worsen  fiscal  positions"  of
the subnational  governments.  The magnitudes  of both  fiscal  dependency
variables  are  very similar, which  suggests that they have the same impact
on  fiscal position  of subnational  governments.  Finally,  we analyzed  the
impact  of subnational  non-tax  autonomy  and subnational  tax  sharing  onOn the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  15
budget balance.  Since  non-tax  revenues  and  tax  sharing  are  at opposite
ends of the revenue autonomy  scale, they were expected  to have opposite
signs.  The  estimation  results  in  the  last two columns  of Table  4 show
that,  although  they  have  opposite  signs  on  unexpected  direction,  the
estimations are statistically insignificant.
Table-4: Replication of the deMello Model:  Decentralization  and Fiscal Positions (1997-1999) 20
Subnational  Subnational  Subnational  Subnational  Subnational
Gov.  Balance  Gov. Balance  Gov. Balance  Gov. Balance  Gov. Balance
Log subnational tax  -0.003*
autonomy  (0.002)
Log subnational fiscal  0.003*
dependency  (1)  (0.000)
Log subnational fiscal  0.002*
dependency  (2)  (0.000)
Log subnational non-tax  0.003
autonomy  (0.002)
Log subnational tax  -0.022
sharing  (0.005)
Adj R 2 0.52  0.71  0.65  0.65  0.63
DW  2.0  2.2  2.2  2.1  2.5
Num. Obs.  19  19  19  19  19
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *  Significant at the 1% level. **  Significant at the 5 %  level.  ** Significant at the  10%  level.
Economic  Growth
Previously,  the debate  over the merits of fiscal  decentralization  was
on theoretical grounds of efficiency gains.  In a recent study, Davoodi and
Zou (1998) analyzed  empirically the impact of fiscal decentralization  on
economic  growth  and  reported  a  negative  relationship  across  46
developing  and  developed  countries.  There  are,  however,  serious
methodological  issues in  their analysis  (Martinez-Vazquez  and  McNab,
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One  problem  in  the  study  is  misspecification  of  the  fiscal
decentralization  variable.  They  measure  fiscal  decentralization  as
subnational  share  of  total  government  expenditure  reported  in  GFS.
Subnational  share of total government expenditure  does not represent the
multidimensionality  of  the  fiscal  decentralization  process.  Without
controlling  for  autonomy  over expenditure  and  revenue  decisions  and
whether  officials  are  democratically  elected,  the  expenditure  share  of
subnational  governments  as a fiscal decentralization  variable  means very
little  in  representing  the  level  of  decentralization.  If  fiscal
decentralization  is  defined  as  revenue  autonomy  of  subnational
governments, then estimation results might change.
To demonstrate  this point, we specified a regression  model similar to
Davoodi  and  Zou  in  order  to  explore  how  the  revenue  structure  of
subnational  governments  affects  estimation  results-whether  the
negative  relationship  between  fiscal  decentralization  and  economic
growth holds,  as they  suggested.  The dependent  variable  in this model is
the  growth rate  of real  per  capita output,  and independent  variables  are
the same ones used in the previous analysis.
Table  5 reports the estimation results. The first two columns present
the impact of own-source  revenues  on economic growth. The subnational
tax  and  non-tax  revenue  autonomy  variables  represent  own-source
revenue  for  subnational  governments  and  have  positive  impact  on
growth.  The next two columns report estimation  results for the impact of
subnational  fiscal dependency  (the  ratios of intergovernmental  transfers
to  total  subnational  revenue).  The  positive  coefficients  of both  fiscal
dependency  variables  are  statistically  insignificant.  The  last  column
presents the  impact of subnational  tax  sharing  (the ratio of shared taxes
to total  subnational  revenues)  on  economic  growth.  Tax  sharing  has  a
negative  significant impact on per capita GDP growth.On the Measurement and Inpact of Fiscal  Decentralization  17
Table-5: Replication of the Davoodi  and Zou Model: Decentralization  and Economic Growth (1997-1999)
Per Capita GDP  Per Capita GDP  Per Capita GDP  Per Capita GDP  Per Capita GDP
Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth
Subnational tax  0.491 *
autonomy  (0.022)
Subnational non-  0.346*
tax autonomy  (0.080)
Subnational fiscal  0.196
dependency  (1)  (0.123)
Subnational fiscal  0.190
dependency  (2)  (0.207)
Subnational tax  -0.437*
sharing  (0.019)
Adj R2 0.90  0.76  0.21  0.22  0.73
DW  2.4  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.8
Num. Obs.  19  19  19  19  19
Standard errors  are in parenthesis.  *  Significant at the 1% level. **  Significant at the 5 %  level. #  Significant at the 10% level.
Public Sector Size
On the relationship between  fiscal decentralization  and public  sector
size, Oates (1985) tested the Brennan and Buchanan "Leviathan"  model2'
for a group of 35 countries and argued that the hypothesis does not hold-
fiscal  decentralization  does  not limit  public  sector  size.  Like previous
studies,  Oates  did  not  take  the  revenue  structure  of  subnational
governments  into consideration,  instead measuring  fiscal decentralization
as subnational share of total government expenditure.
We replicated  Oates'  model to observe how the revenue  structure  of
subnational  governments  affects  the  analysis.  Table  6  reports  the
estimation results. As seen in the first column,  subnational tax autonomy
has  a negative  significant  impact on  public  sector  size,  suggesting  that
the public sector's expenditure  share of GDP decreases  with the increase
in subnational  tax autonomy. The positive coefficient  of the subnational
non-tax autonomy variable suggests, however, that an increase in non-tax
revenues  would  increase  public  sector  size.  The  subnational  non-tax
autonomy  variable  represents  the  share  of  user  charges  andOn the Measiurement and  lmpact (f  Fiscal Decentralization  18
admninistrative  fees  in  total  subnational  revenues.  Given  the  lack  of
public  services in  these  countries,  it  is  normal  to expect public  sector's
size grow, with more services financed with user charges. Comparison  of
the subnational  tax and  non-tax  autonomy  variables  suggests,  however,
that  such growth would be much less than the cutback suggested by the
negative  coefficient  of  the  subnational  tax  autonomy  variable.  The
coefficients  for  the  subnational  fiscal  dependency  and  subnational  tax
sharing  variables  are  statistically  insignificant,  suggesting  that  they  do
not have a significant impact on public sector size.
This  exercise  shows  the  importance  of choosing  the  correct  fiscal
decentralization  variable  in an empirical  study. Once the degree of fiscal
decentralization  has  been  represented  with  the  correct  variable,  the
estimation  results change  significantly.  This  is  not surprising  given  the
interest in fiscal decentralization.
Table-6: Replication  of the Oates Model:  Decentralization and Public Sector Size  (1997-1999)
Total  Government  Total Government  Total Government  Total Government  Total Government
Expenditure % of  Expenditure % of  Expenditure % of  Expenditure % of  Expenditure  % of
GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP  GDP
Subnational tax  -0.328*
autonomy  (0.017)
Subnational non-  0.095*
tax autonomy  (0.014)
Subnational fiscal  -0.064
dependency  (1)  (0.050)
Subnational fiscal  -0.194
dependency  (2)  (0.004)
Subnational tax  0.013
sharing  (0.010)
Adj R2 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99
DW  2.2  2.3  2.5  2.7  2.3
Num. Obs.  19  19  19  19  19
Standard errors are  in parenthesis.  * Significant at the  1%  level. **  Significant at the 5 %  level.  ***  Significant at the 10%  level.On the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  19
CONCLUDING  COMMENTS
Two key conclusions  can be drawn from this look at  issues that are
fundamental  in  analyzing  the  impact  of  fiscal  decentralization  across
countries:
*  While  it  can  be  demonstrated  that  there  was  a  great  deal  of
political  decentralization  in  the  1990s,  taking  the  next  step  to
fiscal  decentralization  has  been  a  bit  sketchy.  This  can  be
explained  in large part by  the fact that it takes time for systems
to  change  from  a  long  history  of  centralization  to
decentralization.  Nonetheless,  the  pre-conditions  of  political
decentralization  are being put in place in many countries, and the
present  decade  promises,  for  good  or  ill,  to  produce  genuine
governmental  restructuring.
*  It  is  important  to  choose  the  correct  fiscal  decentralization
variable  in  an  empirical  study.  Empirical  estimations  are
sensitive  to  variable  selection,  and  the  implications  of making
the wrong choice may be far-reaching in policy design. Once the
fiscal  decentralization  variable  is  estimated  in  a different  way,
the  results  change  significantly,  which  shows  how  fragile  the
estimation  results are.  Therefore,  the analysis  of the  impact  of
fiscal decentralization  on macro indicators requires  qualitative as
well  as quantitative  techniques  that take into account countries'
institutional  structures.On the Mea.surement and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  20
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Annex  1: Summary Statistics of Data in the Baseline  Regressions
Variable  Number  Number of  Mean  Maximu  Minimu  Standard  Data Source
of Cross  Observatio  m  m  Deviatio
Sections  ns  n
Subnational  Tax  6  19  0.065  0.163  0.00()  0.057  OECD
Autonomy.
Subnational  Non-  6  19  0.182  0.363  0.040  0.091  OECD
tax Autonomy  .__
Subnational  Fiscal  6  19  0.308  0.588  0.041  0.153  OECD
Dependency  (1)  _  _
Subnational  Fiscal  6  19  0.208  0.545  0.018  0.167  OECD
Dependency (2)
Subnational  Tax  6  19  0.445  0.910  0.143  0.233  OECD
Sharing  _
Subnational  6  1  9  -0.001  0.010  -0.012  0.005  World Bank
Government  Economic  and
Balance  Social
Database
Per  Capita  GDP  6  19  0.036  0.106  -0.042  0.034  World Bank
Growth  Economic and
Social
Database
Total  Government  6  19  0.378  0.466  0.034  0.099  World Bank
Expenditure  %  of  Economic  and
GDP  Social
DatabaseOn the Measurement  and Impact of Fiscal  Decentralization  25
Notes
l  World Bank Institute, Washington,  DC, USA.
2  World  Bank,  The  State in a Changing World, World  Development  Report
(Washington, DC,  1997), Chapter  1.
3  Ibid.
4  Vinod Thomas  et al.,  The Quality of Growth (New York:  Oxford University
Press for The World Bank, September 2000).
5  Pauly,  1973.
6  Central  government expenditure,  15 percent  of GDP in  1960, double that by
1985 (World Bank,  1997).
7  Bird, 2000.
8  The  question  of social  outcomes  (e.g.,  literacy  rates,  immunization,  school
enrollment)  is not considered  here.
9  The benefit  model  in public finance  is particularly  appealing  to economists,
but  it  faces  two  practical  problems:  it  is  often  difficult  to  implement
appropriate  pricing  policies  and,  since  it  requires  acceptance  of  a  "hard
budget constraint,"  can be politically  difficult to achieve  (Bird,  1993).
'1  This  checklist  is  in  the  form  of  a  multi-page  matrix  and  is  available  at
http://www.worldbank.org.
"  See  Fukasaku  and  deMello  (1998)  and  deMello  (2000)  on  the  impact  of
fiscal  decentralization  on macroeconomic  stability;  Oates (1985)  and Ehdaie
(1994)  on  the  relationship  between  the  government  size  and  fiscal
decentralization;  and  Davoodi  and  Zou  (1998)  on  the  impact  of  fiscal
decentralization  on economic growth.
12 This  is especially  relevant  in the  context of developing  countries,  where  an
important portion  of subnational  expenditures  is either mandated or spent on
behalf of central government.
13 There  are  two  reports:  Flip  de  Kam,  Taxing Powers of State  and Local
Governments, prepared  for the Working  Party on  Tax Policy Analysis  and
Tax Statistics, OECD Committee  on Fiscal Affairs (Paris  1999),  OECD Tax
Policy  Studies  No 1. Leif Jensen  et  al.,  Fiscal Design  across Levels  of
Government, Year 2000 Surveys, prepared  for the Working  Group on Fiscal
Design  across  Levels  of  Government,  Central  and  Eastern  European
Countries (Paris, 2001).
4  In order  to identify  subnational  governments'  control over revenue  sources,
taxes  are  subdivided  into  categories  based  on  the  degree  of tax  autonomy
(Table 3 lists these categories in a descending  order starting with the highest
degree  of local  autonomy).  Own-tax  revenues  are the  sum of the  first three
categories  listed in Table 3 (taxes  for  which subnational  governments  have
the  power to  determine  both  tax  rate  and  base  or either  one  of them);  tax
sharing revenues  are the sum of last four categories.On the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal Decentralization  26
15  All of these characteristics  have implications  when one considers the degree
of decentralization  in a given country.
16  In  both  Davoodi  and  Zou  (1998)  and  deMello  (2000),  there  is  a  clear
dichotomy  in  the estimation results  for developing  and developed  countries.
In both,  the impact of fiscal decentralization  on macro  indicators  is positive
in  developed  countries  and  negative  in  developing  countries.
Overrepresentation  of the degree  of fiscal  decentralization  in the  aggregate
figure  for  developing  countries  might  be  the  reason  for  the  negative
relationship.
17  If  greater  decentralization  increases  the  number  of  alternative  fiscal
jurisdictions,  any  attempt  to  increase  tax  rates  in  one  jurisdiction  would
result  in  migration  of its  residents  to  another  (Tiebout,  1956).  In  Tiebout's
analysis,  taxpayers  migrate  in  order  to  avoid  higher  taxes  and
interjurisdictional  competition,  thereby  limiting  excessive  taxing  power  of
the governments.  Along  the lines of Tiebout,  Brennan  and Buchanan  (1980)
developed  the  "Leviathan"  hypothesis,  which  argues  that  fiscal
decentralization  serves  as  a  constraint  on  the  behavior  of the  revenue-
maximizing  government.  The  "Leviathan"  hypothesis  predicts  that  the
overall  size  of  the  public  sector  should  vary  inversely  with  fiscal
decentralization;  fiscal  decentralization  increases  competition  among  local
governments, which ultimately  limits the size of the public sector.
18  We  are  aware  of the  shortcoming  of  their approach  discussed  on different
studies such as Martinez-Vazquez  and McNab,  1997.
19  We  have  only  three  years  of  data  for six  countries  except  Hungary  (four
years).  Therefore,  in  order  to  avoid  degrees  of  freedom  problem,  we  use
bivariate  regressions  rather  than  the  original  models  of  multivariate
estimations.  A summary of descriptive  statistics  and data sources is reported
in the appendix.
20  In order to alleviate  specification  error problems,  we used  state dummies  to
capture  state-specific  characteristics,  e.g.,  location,  climate,  and  initial
endowments.  Therefore,  our  econometric  estimates  are  based  on  a  fixed
effect  model.  In  addition,  given  the  variations  in  the  dependent  variables
across the observation  units,  with some  states exhibiting much more variance
than  others,  the  potential  heteroskedasticity  problem  is  corrected  for  by
utilizing the Generalized  Least Square (GLS)  estimation procedure.
21 About "Leviathan"  hypothesis  see footnote  17.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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